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Market Discipline in the
Governance of U.S. Bank
Holding Companies
Monitoring versus Inﬂuencing
Robert R. Bliss and Mark J. Flannery
4.1 Introduction
That markets discipline ﬁrms and their managers is an article of faith
among ﬁnancial economists, with surprisingly little direct empirical sup-
port. The market discipline paradigm requires (a) that the necessary infor-
mation is publicly available and that the private beneﬁts to monitoring
outweigh the costs, (b) that rational investors continually gather and pro-
cess information about traded ﬁrms whose securities they hold and about
the markets in which they operate, (c) that investors’ assessments of ﬁrm
condition and future prospects are impounded into the ﬁrm’s equity and
debt prices, and (d) that managers operate in the security holders’ inter-
ests. The prices of a ﬁrm’s traded securities are the most obvious public
signal by which stakeholder/monitors make their evaluations known to
management.
The idea that market prices provide informative signals that aﬀect how
managers run their companies occupies pride of place in most introduc-
tory microeconomic classes. Likewise, ﬁnance textbooks assert that inves-
tors lead ﬁrms toward appropriate decisions by changing security prices
1071. The other two pillars are minimum capital standards and supervisory review of capital
adequacy.
2. Just as the term market discipline is frequently used without suﬃcient reﬁnement, so
too do academics tend to use the term monitoring in various senses. Diamond’s (1984) path-
breaking paper on delegated monitoring requires that the lender make advance arrangements
to assess what actually happens to a borrower’s cash ﬂows. Other writers envision monitoring
as an ongoing process by which a lender deters manager/owners from transferring wealth
from the debt holders to themselves, usually through monitoring and enforcement of ex ante
negotiated covenants that restrict managerial discretion. Williamson (1986) models monitor-
ing as an ex post activity: given default, a bank pays to audit and uncover fraud.
in response to apparent trends and managerial policies. Only in the more
advanced classes do students learn that product market externalities or
deviations from the perfect capital market assumptions can undermine ﬁ-
nancial market discipline. Indeed, much of modern corporate ﬁnance con-
cerns the ways in which markets may fail to discipline ﬁrms or ﬁrm man-
agers appropriately.
Financial regulators are concerned that the increasing complexity of
large banking organizations makes them diﬃcult to monitor and control
using traditional supervisory tools. Financial regulators have been increas-
ingly drawn to the idea that private investors can aﬀect the actions of
ﬁnancial ﬁrms. This interest in harnessing market disciplinary forces to
assist regulatory goals reﬂects the growing evidence that investors can as-
sess a ﬁnancial ﬁrm’s true condition quite well. The Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision’s (1999) consultative paper on capital adequacy as-
serts that “[m]arket discipline imposes strong incentives on banks to con-
duct their business in a safe, sound and eﬃcient manner” and designates
market discipline as one of the three pillars on which future ﬁnancial regu-
lation should be based.1 A Federal Reserve task force has recently inves-
tigated whether requiring large banking ﬁrms to issue subordinated debt
on a regular basis would enhance supervision. The 1999 Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, which overhauled banking regulation in the United States, re-
quired that the ﬁfty largest nationally insured banks, if nationally char-
tered, have at least one issue of debt outstanding rated A or better.
The concept of market discipline incorporates two distinct components:
the ability of investors to evaluate a ﬁrm’s true condition, and the respon-
siveness of ﬁrm managers to the investor feedback impounded in security
prices. Although the banking literature often fails to distinguish clearly
between these components, their implications for regulatory reform diﬀer
substantially. For the sake of clarity, we deﬁne two distinct aspects of mar-
ket discipline in this paper: market monitoring and market inﬂuence.2
● Monitoring refers to the hypothesis that investors accurately under-
stand changes in a ﬁrm’s condition and incorporate those assessments
promptly into the ﬁrm’s security prices. Monitoring generates the
market signals to which managers hypothetically respond.
108 Robert R. Bliss and Mark J. Flannery3. See the recent survey by Flannery (1998) and earlier papers by Gilbert (1990) and Ber-
ger (1991).
4. Another impediment to market discipline is sometimes a legal environment that makes
stockholder activism and hostile takeovers diﬃcult. The recent failures of a number of hostile
takeover attempts in France and Germany, with the active participation of governments on
the side of target management, are examples.
5. Markets—other than the securities markets considered in this paper and in recent regu-
latory proposals—also inﬂuence managers. These include the market for corporate control
(takeovers), the managerial labor market (turnover), and the direct inﬂuence exerted by large
stockholders. See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a review of the relevant theory and evi-
dence.
● Inﬂuence is the process by which a security price change engenders
ﬁrm (manager) responses to counteract adverse changes in ﬁrm con-
dition.
The market discipline paradigm is inherently asymmetric. Negative mar-
ket signals indicate that investors may want management to make changes,
whereas positive signals generally do not suggest that change is desired.
Regulatory discipline also focuses primarily on avoiding or reversing ad-
verse changes in ﬁrm condition.
Extensive evidence supports the hypothesis that markets can eﬀectively
identify a ﬁrm’s true ﬁnancial condition, at least on a contemporaneous
basis.3 However, accurate market signals are not suﬃcient to ensure that
investors can collectively inﬂuence the actions of ﬁrm management. The
ﬁnance literature provides numerous reasons to be circumspect about the
ability of market participants to inﬂuence managers: asymmetric informa-
tion, costly monitoring, principal-agent problems, and conﬂicts of interest
among stakeholders.4 The optimal contracting literature is premised on the
idea that investor/owners are disadvantaged vis-a `-vis managers in ensuring
that the ﬁrm is run in the investors’ interests. Furthermore, diﬀerent types
of claimants may evaluate managerial actions diﬀerently. Bondholders are
less interested in upside potential than in seeing that default is avoided.
Stockholders, on the other hand, may prefer a riskier investment strategy
as long as the expected return compensates them for the additional risk.
Thus, the idea of market discipline raises the question of whichmarket.5
We have comparatively little evidence about the ability of equity or (es-
pecially) debt owners to inﬂuence routine managerial actions. Stockhold-
ers and bondholders can surely inﬂuence managers in extremis. For ex-
ample, Penn Central’s management was forced to take action when money
market participants refused to roll over its commercial paper. The ﬁrm
w a sf o r c e dt oﬁle for Chapter 11, substantially aﬀecting all concerned.
Stockholders can also vote out management, and poor ﬁrm performance
increases the likelihood of managerial turnover. Suﬃciently disgruntled
stockholders can also create an environment that facilitates a hostile take-
over. However, policy proposals for using market discipline to enhance
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impose extreme discipline (such as managerial turnover or forced mergers) for banking ﬁrms.
To the extent that institutional arrangements have reduced investors’ incentives to monitor
and inﬂuence, our study will be biased toward ﬁnding no eﬀective market inﬂuence.
banking supervision usually envisage something more commonplace, con-
structive, and benign than precipitating bankruptcy or replacing manage-
ment through takeovers.
This paper seeks to complement the existing literature on market moni-
toring by looking for direct evidence of stockholder and bondholder inﬂu-
ence in the U.S. banking sector. Because ﬁnancial regulators are actively
considering the formal use of market discipline in their supervisory pro-
cesses, an empirical investigation of market inﬂuence on bank holding
companies (BHCs) is quite timely. Even beyond the obvious policy impli-
cations, however, BHCs provide a fruitful area for examining investor in-
ﬂuence more generally. First, banking ﬁrms have relatively high leverage,
which makes shareholders unusually sensitive to changes in asset value
or risk. Second, BHC deposits have absolute priority over other ﬁnancial
liabilities, which should increase the urgency with which subordinated
bondholders feel the results of adverse changes in asset value or risk.
Third, the Federal Reserve collects extensive ﬁnancial data about BHCs,
and the industry is relatively homogeneous. It is thus feasible to examine
detailed BHC asset, liability, and cash ﬂow changes from one calendar
quarter to the next.6
We begin by showing that stock and bond prices frequently move in
opposite directions, which presumably gives them opposing preferences
about managerial action. We then investigate whether managerial actions
appear to be associated with prior returns on BHC stocks and bonds. We
experiment with multiple measures of market signals, a large number of
managerial “action” variables, and various lags between signal and poten-
tial action. What evidence we ﬁnd of market inﬂu e n c ei sw e a ka n d ,a tb e s t ,
mixed. Certainly, we ﬁnd no prima facie support for the hypothesis that
managers consistently respond to quarter-to-quarter changes in bond or
stock prices.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 discusses agency prob-
lems pertaining to complex U.S. BHCs that generate the need for disci-
plinary forces. Section 4.3 discusses the construction of the study’sd a t a
set. Section 4.4 presents evidence on the extent to which bondholders
and shareholders have common—as opposed to conﬂicting—goals in dis-
ciplining ﬁrm managers. Section 4.5 describes and motivates our tests
for market inﬂuence, and the results of those tests are presented in Sec-
tion 4.6. The last section discusses the regulatory implications of our ﬁnd-
ings.
110 Robert R. Bliss and Mark J. Flannery7. Hubbard and Palia (1995) speciﬁcally evaluate management compensation in banking.
8. See, for example, Jensen and Murphy (1990), or Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999).
4.2 Agency Problems and the Rationale for Stakeholder Inﬂuence
The governance problem in a levered ﬁrm generally involves three
groups: shareholders, bondholders, and (unless the managers also own the
ﬁrm) managers. Correspondingly, there are three possible types of agency
conﬂict in the typical corporation:
1. Stockholders must induce managers to maximize ﬁrm value by work-
ing hard and making appropriate risk-return tradeoﬀs.
2. Bondholders have an analogous attitude toward managerial eﬀort,
but diﬀerent preferences about risk bearing.
3. Stockholders may use their control rights to impose unanticipated
r i s k so nt h eﬁrm’s bondholders.
Numerous theoretical analyses have evaluated the ﬁrst and third of
these conﬂicts, but we have relatively little empirical information about
the importance of either. Jensen and Meckling (1976) ﬁrst observed that
shareholders need to align managers’ interests with their own. This can
occur through performance-related managerial compensation (e.g.,
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988; Kaplan 1994a, b; Hadlock and Lummer
1997).7 Managers’ employment prospects are also related to prior ﬁrm per-
formance (Mikkelson and Partch 1997; Martin and McConnell 1991;
Denis and Denis 1995; Canella, Fraser, and Lee 1995; Brickley, Linck, and
Coles 1999). Finally, ﬁrm value responds signiﬁcantly to board compo-
sition (Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner 1997; Hirshleifer and Thakor 1998;
and, for banking in particular, Brickley and James 1987) and the presence
of block shareholders (DeYoung, Spong, and Sullivan 2001 for banking,
and Ang, Cole, and Lin 2000 more generally).
It is diﬃcult to demonstrate the eﬃcacy of these control mechanisms.
Although they appear to work well in most situations, suﬃciently large
private gains from perquisite consumption or self-dealing could still lead
managers to ignore the compensation consequences of their actions.8 Fur-
thermore, much of the existing literature deals with “large” e v e n t ss u c ha s
takeovers or managerial terminations, as opposed to more mundane events
that can cumulatively aﬀect ﬁrm performance.
The existing studies concern the ability of shareholders to aﬀect mana-
gerial actions. We have located no previous research into the ability of
bondholders to inﬂuence managers. Both bondholders and stockholders
may wish to monitor managerial slacking and perquisite consumption.
An increase in a ﬁrm’s asset value raises both share and (weakly) debt
Market Discipline in U.S. Bank Holding Companies 1119. The impact of a debt overhang on shareholders’ investment incentives is one exception
to this statement. Again, this is an extreme circumstance.
prices.9 Ceteris paribus, bondholders and stockholders share an interest in
the ﬁrm’s continued proﬁtability. But ceteris rarely is paribus. Bondholder
and stockholder interests strongly diverge regarding the risk that may ac-
company higher ﬁrm proﬁts. Greater asset risk or ﬁnancial leverage, for
example, may raise the value of stockholders’ option-like claim on the
ﬁrm’s residual cash ﬂows. Stockholders beneﬁtf r o mr i s ka sl o n ga si ti s
associated with a suﬃciently high rate of expected return, but an unantici-
pated increase in risk generally reduces the value of ﬁxed-income claims.
Bond covenants are designed to limit a ﬁrm’s ability to shift risk by giving
bondholders some control rights under some circumstances. Stockholders
accept such covenants because they can increase overall ﬁrm value (Smith
and Warner 1979; Myers 1977).
The incentives of managers, beyond consuming perquisites, are ambigu-
ous. If managers’ incentives are well aligned with those of shareholders
(e.g., through performance-based compensation), their actions may tend
to harm bondholders. If managers receive insuﬃcient pay for perfor-
mance, managerial claims on the ﬁrm resemble bonds more closely than
equity, and managers may reduce equity values by acting too conserva-
tively.
Section 4.4 provides some evidence about the relative frequency with
which bond and stock investors are aﬀected in opposite directions when
new market information arrives.
4.3 Sample Selection and Data Sources
We assembled our BHC sample by forming the intersection of three
data sets: the Y-9 Reports (Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank
Holding Companies, available on the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
website, http://www.chicagofed.org), the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) Stock Returns and Master Files, and the Warga/Lehman
Brothers Corporate Bond Database (Warga 1995). Our sample period be-
gan in 1986, prior to which the Y-9 Reports lacked suﬃcient detail, and
continued through December 1997. We did not require that a ﬁrm exist
for the entire period but used whatever data were available for each BHC.
A total of 107 BHCs were simultaneously listed in all three data sources
for at least part of the 1986–88 period.
The Y-9 Reports provide information on BHC balance sheets and in-
come statements. Although speciﬁc Y-9 variable deﬁnitions changed over
time, we could combine data series to construct variables with reasonably
consistent deﬁnitions throughout the sample period.
Stock returns, dividends, prices, and shares outstanding were obtained
112 Robert R. Bliss and Mark J. Flanneryfrom the CRSP monthly stock ﬁles. We computed quarterly returns and
two measures of excess returns. The simple excess return is the diﬀerence
between the stock return and the contemporaneous stock market index
returns (the CRSP value-weighted index of all stocks listed on the NYSE,
Amex, and Nasdaq). We also estimated the market model parameters for
each ﬁrm, using a sixty-month moving window. The resulting parameters
were used to compute the following month’s market model excess return.
The process was repeated for each month, rolling forward the estimation
window and forecast period. Our results are robust to the deﬁnition of
excess returns used. The excess returns provide the smallest number of
usable observations because their computation requires a continuous ﬁve-
year stock price history. We therefore present results only for raw returns
and simple excess returns when analyzing the interaction between stocks
and bonds in section 4.4, and only simple excess returns when analyzing
evidence of market inﬂuence in section 4.6.
BHC bond information, taken from the Warga/Lehman Brothers Cor-
porate Bond Database, includes price, monthly credit rating, yield, price,
accrued interest, and face value outstanding applicable to the end of each
calendar month. We computed quarterly holding period returns and
quarter-to-quarter yield changes. The 107 BHCs had a total of 761 bonds
outstanding for at least some part of the sample period. The literature
provides little guidance for constructing benchmarks to measure excess
bond performance. We constructed multiple indexes to ensure robustness
of our reported results. Within indexes, bonds were assigned to buckets
containing bonds of similar terms to maturity and ratings (using Moody
and Standard & Poor’s [S&P] ratings to produce two sets of indexes). Rat-
ings were grouped into eleven categories that corresponded to Moody and
S&P ratings, suppressing the  or  qualiﬁers attached to the basic rating
deﬁnitions. Three term-to-maturity categories were used: zero to ﬁve years,
ﬁve to ten years, and more than ten years. Two alternative bond popula-
tions were used to form indexes. “All Firms” indexes were constructed
using all domestic industrial, utility, transportation, and ﬁnancial industry
bonds in the Warga database. The “All Financials” indexes were con-
structed using only bonds of corporations classiﬁed as ﬁnancial institu-
tions. Both the “All Firms” and “All Financials” indexes included the BHC
bonds used in this study. For each rating/term classiﬁcation bucket, index
yields, yield changes, and returns were constructed using both equal and
value weighting as measured by face value of amounts outstanding at the
end of the previous quarter. The result was eight indexes—each containing
thirty-three yield, yield-change, and return series—against which to mea-
sure excess bond performance.
Each BHC has a single common stock issue outstanding (we restricted
our analysis to common stock—those with Committee on Uniform Secu-
rity Identiﬁcation Procedures [CUSIP] numbers ending in 10) but may
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have multiple bonds outstanding at any given time. For BHCs with mul-
tiple bonds outstanding in a given quarter, we constructed BHC-wide
bond measures by aggregating the raw and excess bond performance mea-
sures across outstanding bonds within each BHC each quarter.10 Aggrega-
tion was done using both arithmetic and principal-weighted averages of
eachperformance measure.Foreach BHC-quarterwethus havetwo setsof
raw yields, yield changes, and returns, and 16 sets of yield, yield changes,
and return spreads over various indices.
There is no obviously appropriate manner for aggregating and compar-
ing yields of bonds of diﬀering maturities. We have evaluated a variety of
index construction methods, and our results are robust across methods.
Therefore, we present results only for raw bond returns and excess returns
measured against the principal-weighted “All Firms” bonds index. BHCs
with multiple bonds are assigned returns for a principal-weighted average
of their individual bond returns and excess returns. Hereafter, in referring
to bonds we will mean these measures aggregated within BHCs.
The ﬁnal data set includes stock and bond returns and contemporane-
ous accounting information for 2,490 ﬁrm-quarters over the period June
1986 to March 1998.
4.4 Correlations between Bond and Stock Returns
As we pointed out in section 4.2, the potential divergence of stock- and
bondholders’ preferences aﬀects the search for evidence of market inﬂu-
ence. Previous studies presenting evidence on the comovements of stock
and bond returns include Kwan (1996) for all industrial ﬁrms and Ellis
and Flannery (1992) for bank equity and CD rates. In both studies, the
evidence suggests that changes in the value of a BHC’ss e c u r i t yr e ﬂect, for
the most part, the expected asset payoﬀs, and not the assets’ return volatil-
ity. Accordingly, a ﬁrm’s stock and bond returns tend to be positively cor-
related because both groups tend to evaluate new developments similarly.
In this situation, the inﬂuence of bondholders may be diﬃcult to separate
from that of shareholders. Requiring banks to issue subordinated deben-
tures might then be a questionable policy, because bondholders’ assess-
ments and inﬂuence would simply replicate those of shareholders. We
therefore begin by evaluating whether bond and shareholder preferences
are suﬃciently diﬀerent to permit us to identify separate bondholder and
stockholder inﬂuences on bank managers.
Table 4.1 reports the Pearson correlations and rank order correlations
for stock and bond returns and excess returns. Given the leptokurtic distri-
114 Robert R. Bliss and Mark J. Flannery11. If x is the percentage of stock-up (Su) moves and y is the percentage of bond-up (Bu)
moves, then if stock and bond movements were independent we would expect to see xy SuBu
moves, x(1  y) SuBd m o v e s ,a n ds oo n .
bution of returns, the rank correlations provide a robust conﬁrmation of
the Pearson correlation measures. Table 4.1 indicates a strong positive cor-
relation between raw and excess returns within each type of security. The
excess stock and bond returns are much less strongly correlated with each
other than are the raw returns. Nonetheless, both the Pearson and the
rank-order correlations are all signiﬁcantly positive (at the 5 percent level).
Other stock and bond excess return measures yield results similar to those
shown in table 4.1.
Table 4.2 provides information about an alternative way to summarize
the interaction of BHC stock and bond values: according to the sign of
their contemporaneous quarterly movements. Headings A and B classify
each (raw or excess) return as either positive or negative. Whether we mea-
sure returns as raw or excess, chi-square tests reject (with p-values of 0.001)
the hypothesis that stock and bond return classiﬁcations were indepen-
dent.11 Raw stock and bond returns have the same sign in a majority of
the BHC-quarters we analyze. (Raw returns are like-signed 65.1 percent
of the time, whereas excess stock and bond returns move together 55.0
Table 4.1 Stock and Bond Return Correlations
Stock Returns Bond Returns






Raw 0.310 0.212 1.00






Raw 0.271 0.189 1.00
Excess 0.157 0.129 0.449 1.00
Notes: Raw stock returns are quarterly, inclusive of dividends. Raw bond returns are quar-
terly, inclusive of accrued interest. Excess stock returns are the diﬀerence between the stock
return and the CRSP value-weighted combined NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq market index.
Excess bond returns are the bond return relative to the rating/term-matched bucket in the
value weighted all bonds S&P-based index.
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Down 10.6% 24.2% 34.8%
293 1489 1782
Up 10.7% 54.5% 65.2%
583 2151 2734




Down 27.9% 19.5% 47.5%
694 742 1,436
Up 25.4% 27.1% 52.5%
1,458 1,276 2,490
Bond signal marginal distribution 55.3% 46.7% 100%
Bond Returns Stock Signal
Marginal
Down Flat Up Distribution
C. Raw Returns Tertiary Breakdown
Stock returns
Down 411 283 217 911
15.0% 10.3% 7.9% 33.3%
Flat 333 286 293 912
12.2% 10.5% 10.7% 33.3%
Up 167 343 401 911
6.1% 12.5% 14.7% 33.3%
Bond signal marginal 911 912 911 2734
distribution 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 100%
D. Excess Returns Tertiary Breakdown
Stock returns
Down 391 251 269 911
14.3% 9.2% 9.8% 33.3%
Flat 276 344 292 912
10.1% 12.6% 10.7% 33.3%
Up 244 317 350 911
8.9% 11.6% 12.8% 33.3%
Bond signal marginal 911 912 911 2,734
distribution 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 100%12. 1998 data were omitted from the ﬁgures because the Warga/Lehman Brothers database
ends in March of that year.
percent of the time.) This positive correlation between stock and bond
returns is consistent with the hypothesis that most security returns reﬂect
changes in the ﬁrm’s overall value, and not simply a redistribution of value
between equity and debt.
We would expect market inﬂuence to be most readily apparent in the
upper-left cells of headings A and B, where all investors lose money. By
contrast, the impact on ﬁrm claimants derived from (advertent or inadver-
tent) changes in the ﬁrm’s leverage or asset volatility is evidenced by stock
and bond returns moving in opposite directions (upper-right and lower-
left cells). In these instances, stockholder and bondholder preferences con-
ﬂict, and we may be able to identify which group, if either, inﬂuences ﬁrm
managers more strongly.
Headings C and D of table 4.2 elaborate this analysis with a three-part
taxonomy for security returns. Each stock and bond return was assigned
to one of three equally sized groups: Up, Flat, or Down. Chi-square statis-
tics reject the hypothesis that the stock and bond returns are independent
in either C or D. We expect to see the strongest evidence of market inﬂu-
ence when the signals are large and negative—in Down-Down cells. Con-
versely, strong but contradictory signals (Up-Down and Down-Up) should
provide the best opportunity to compare the eﬃcacy of equity versus bond
preferences. Stockholder-only inﬂuence will be reﬂected in particularly
strong responses to cells along the top row, while bondholder-only inﬂu-
ence should manifest itself in the left-most column. Contradictory stock
and bond signals are common, with strong contradictory signals (Up-
Down or Down-Up) occurring about 14 percent of the time for raw re-
turns and 19 percent of the time for excess returns.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present year-by-year information about the propor-
tion of ﬁrm-quarters falling into each of the four binary categories.12 If the
direction of market signals from stocks and bonds were perfectly corre-
lated, the inner two bars (SuBd and SdBu) would both be zero. This clearly
is not the case: a chi-square test rejects the hypothesis that bond and stock
values move independently of one another in six of the twelve sample years
for the raw returns in ﬁgure 4.1 (at the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance).
Although the excess returns are more symmetrically distributed, chi-
square tests reject the independence of stock and bond returns in eight of
twelve sample years. Finally, these two ﬁgures indicate that the distribution
of stock and bond return signs varies substantially across years. Accord-
ingly, we will include a dummy variable identifying each calendar year in
our regression models below.
To summarize, a typical BHC’s stock and bond returns are moderately
positively correlated overall. However, the data include enough contrasting























































































































213. Our methodology for seeking what we call inﬂuence is tied to observed managerial
actions. Allen Berger has pointed out that inﬂuence can also result in managers deciding not
to take certain actions—for example, not undertaking certain risky types of investments
because the bondholders would be harmed and this would subsequently drive up the ﬁrm’s
cost of capital. Such absence of action cannot be measured, so we cannot conclude whether
this anticipatory inﬂuence exists. However, if inﬂuence is apparent in the observed manage-
rial actions, it may provide some support for the belief that unobserved anticipatory inﬂuence
also obtains.
14. The structure of our model assumes that the manager’s response to shocks in one
period cannot be completed in the same period. In our empirical implementation this means
that managers cannot oﬀset, in the same quarter, exogenous shocks that we observe as
changes in the ﬁrm balance sheet over the same quarter.
15. Another implication of rational expectations is that returns will be serially uncorre-
lated, even if market inﬂuence (discipline) obtains.
price signals to provide hope that we can identify separate stock market
a n db o n dm a r k e ti n ﬂuences (if there are any), and to determine if one
source of discipline dominates or reinforces the other.
4.5 Methodology for Detecting Stock and Bond Market Inﬂuences
We begin with a working deﬁnition of market inﬂuence: Market inﬂu-
ence obtains when the return on the ﬁrm’s securities induces managerial
actions, which in turn increases security value.13 In order to detect market
inﬂuence we look for an eﬀect of stock and bond returns on managerial
actions. We ﬁrst illustrate our methodology with a simpliﬁed version of
the regressions we actually run. An extensive discussion of this simpliﬁed
model in section 4.5.1 indicates which inferences can (or cannot) be drawn
about market inﬂuence. Section 4.5.2 describes how we implement the
model estimation.
4.5.1 Identifying Inﬂuence
Consider a ﬁrm whose value is aﬀected by a single exogenous variable
(X) and one endogenous variable (A) controlled by the manager. The ﬁrm
has a single security, a stock, whose price reﬂects the ﬁrm’s expected future
value. At time t  1 stockholders observe the exogenous shock, form an
expectation of the action the manager will take in response, and adjust the
stock price. The net eﬀect of all these changes is the stock’s quarterly re-
turn Rt1. The manager’s expected action during quarter t depends on the
past stock return Rt1 and/or Xt1: Et1(At)  fA(Rt1, Xt1). We linearize
this relationship and estimate Et1(At)  a0  a1Rt1  a2Xt1, which pro-
vides an expected managerial action conditional on information available
at t  1.14 The manager’s action is observed at the end of quarter t, and it
is composed of an expected and an unexpected component: At  Et1(At)
 εt. If the stockholders are rational, the unexpected component (εt) of the
action At will be mean zero and uncorrelated with the information avail-
able at time t  1.15 We can therefore combine these last two equations
to get
120 Robert R. Bliss and Mark J. Flannery16. We assume that neither the manager nor the stockholder can predict future exoge-
nous shocks.
(1) Aa a R a X tt t t =+ + + −− 01 12 1 ˜ , ε
which can be estimated with OLS. Investor inﬂuence appears in the form
of a nonzero a1.
Unfortunately, investor rationality may cause a bias in the estimated
coeﬃcient a1.I n v e s t o r s ’ expectations about managerial actions will be im-
pounded in Rt1:
(1a) Rg X E A tt t t t −− − − =+ 11 1 1 [,( ) ]˜ . 
Here,  ˜
t1 is a random residual. Linearizing equation (1a) and substituting
it into equation (1) gives
(1b) Aa a g g X g E A a X tt t t t t t =+ + + + + + −− − − 01 01 12 1 1 2 1 [( ) ˜ ] ˜ .  ε
The bracketed term in equation (1b)—the lagged stock return—contains
the (unbiased) expected value of At, hence biasing the estimated a1 coeﬃ-
cient upward (away from zero). We try to minimize the impact of this
endogeneity by proxying for security returns with dummy variables in one
of our implemented regressions models, as is shown in equation (3b).
The linear speciﬁcation in equation (1) assumes that managers respond
equally to positive and negative equity returns. This seems unlikely—why
change a winning strategy? We therefore partition Rt1 into two variables,
R
t1 and R































and change equation (1) to






− 01 11 1 2 1 ε .
If managers make fewer changes in response to positive stock returns than
to negative returns, a
1 should be more prominent than a
1 . Moreover, an
action taken in the wake of a negative stock return is readily interpreted
as a corrective response, whereas a managerial action following a positive
stock return is more diﬃcult to interpret. The speciﬁcation in equation
(1c) should thus provide more power than the speciﬁcation in equation (1).
At time t, the ﬁrm’s value responds to the surprise component of At, plus
any new exogenous shock Xt.16 Stockholders then update their estimate of
ﬁrm value, giving a (linearized) realized return over period t of
Market Discipline in U.S. Bank Holding Companies 12117. Regression misspeciﬁcation or errors in variables can also cause a ˆ to equal 0. One such
problem is particularly relevant to examining market inﬂuence. Suppose investors expect that
managers will always take the most appropriate action in response to an external shock, but
that action varies across shocks. This is an omitted (unobservable) variables problem that
mistakenly biases us against ﬁnding evidence of investor inﬂuence.
(2) R b b A E A bX b b bX tt t t t t t t t =+ − + +=+ + + − 01 1 2 01 2 [( ) ] ˜ ˆ ˜ ,  ε
where ε ˆt is the estimated residual from equation (1c). The sign of b1 indi-
cates what action shareholders desire. Suppose the action being evaluated
is a cut in dividends. Under most circumstances, a dividend cut is inter-
preted as bad news for the ﬁrm. At the start of period t, investors know
there is some probability that their dividend will be cut. If the cut actually
happens, ε ˆt  0a n dRt falls. If the dividend cut does not happen, ε ˆt  0
and Rt rises. Equation (2) thus has b1  0 if an action is not thought to
enhance ﬁrm value. By contrast, if stockholders thought that the action
under consideration was a good idea—e.g., an increase in consumer
loans—a surprise realization of this policy would increase Rt and we
should ﬁnd b1  0 in equation (2).
Market inﬂuence requires that both a ˆ1 and b ˆ
1 diﬀer signiﬁcantly from
zero: Lagged returns help predict managerial actions, and security values
increase when those actions are actually taken. If a ˆ1  0, managers seem
not to respond reliably to recent security returns. This ﬁnding would not
support the hypothesis of investor inﬂuence.17 An estimated 	 ˆ 1  0 implies
that managers respond to past returns in choosing how to act, but we must
still determine if the action enhances share value.
Turning now to the response regression in equation (2), our most com-
mon ﬁnding (shown later) is that b ˆ
1  0, indicating that the action surprise
does not aﬀect investor beliefs about ﬁrm value. A possible alternative
explanation for this result is that we have chosen inappropriate measures
of managerial action. (Investors do not care about changes in our mea-
sured actions, or management cannot closely control the “action” vari-
ables.) However, we selected a large number of disparate action variables
in hopes that at least a few would be relevant. Still a third possibility is
that we have appropriate action variables, but equation (1c) poorly esti-
mates their surprise component. (The relatively high R2 statistics in table
4.6 suggest that this is not a serious problem for at least some of the ac-
tion variables.)
Advocates of market discipline generally think of beneﬁcial inﬂuence,
but agency problems in the ﬁrm’s governance may cause managers to be-
have perversely. We use a combination of the b1 and a1 coeﬃcients to dis-
tinguish good from bad managerial responses. Consider ﬁrst the case of
b1  0, for which a positive action surprise at time t is associated with a
positive contemporaneous stock return. Beneﬁcial inﬂuence thus requires
that managers be more likely to take this action when preceding stock
122 Robert R. Bliss and Mark J. Flannery18. Interpreting managerial responses to positive security returns is diﬃcult to justify as
an indication of investor control. Accordingly, we concentrate our subsequent discussion on
the a
1 coeﬃcients from equation (1c), rather than the a
1 estimates.
19. We investigated whether our results depend on the particular return variables used.
They do not. We therefore used the simple stock excess return—the return relative to the
value-weighted stock market index—and the within-BHC value-weighted bond excess return
measured relative to the value-weighted index using S&P credit classiﬁcations.
returns were negative.18 That is, we want a
1  0; large negative returns
make it more likely that managers will do the appropriate thing. Con-
versely, if b1  0, shareholders want less of this action to follow a stock
price decline. Beneﬁcial inﬂuence would therefore have a
1  0 for this sort
of managerial action. These requirements are summarized in table 4.3.
Equations (1c) and (2) lay out the basic framework for detecting market
inﬂuence. Applying this methodology to actual data requires a consider-
able increase in complexity, although the core ideas remain unchanged.
4.5.2 Implementation
Estimating the regression model in equations (1c) and (2) requires ex-
plicit selection of security returns, action variables under close managerial
control, and a set of balance sheet variables not (completely) under mana-
gerial control that proxy for the exogenous shocks to BHC value. We have
also included a set of control variables to proxy for changes in the eco-
nomic environment.
It is usual to think that security returns have a systematic component
that reﬂects exogenous shocks to the economy and an idiosyncratic com-
ponent that reﬂects ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors including managerial actions. Be-
cause an individual ﬁrm’s managers cannot be held accountable for the
systematic component of returns, we measure each BHC’s stock and bond
returns as the excess return, over appropriate market return indexes.19 We
Table 4.3 Interpretation of Inﬂuence as “Beneﬁcial” or “Perverse”




t1  a2Xt1  εt
where R
t1 








1  0 a
1  0
b1  0 beneﬁcial perverse
b1  0 perverse beneﬁcial
Market Discipline in U.S. Bank Holding Companies 12320. Our use of bond returns as one measure of BHC value necessarily assumes that subor-
dinated debenture holders felt exposed to default risks. Although there is some question
whether this was true for most of the 1980s, by the end of that decade BHC debenture rates
clearly reﬂected cross-sectional variations in default probabilities (Flannery and Sorescu
1996; DeYoung et al. 2001).
denote these excess returns Rstk
t and Rbnd
t respectively. Firm excess returns
reﬂect (actual and anticipated) managerial actions, plus idiosyncratic ex-
ogenous shocks.20 Because our interest lies with managerial inﬂuence, we
will need to control for the latter.
The Inﬂuence Equation
The corporate governance literature has focused primarily on stock-
holder-manager interactions, but the regulatory beneﬁts of market disci-
pline focus on bank debt. Bondholders and regulators confront similar
risk-return tradeoﬀs: They do not share in the upside return to risky pro-
jects but are exposed to loss if the projects fail. In order to evaluate
whether investors can reliably inﬂuence managers, we must control for
both stockholders’ and bondholders’ preferences. Moreover, we must in-
teract these preferences in order to account for potentially oﬀsetting pres-
sures coming from the two groups. Finally, we conjecture that positive
market signals may elicit less reaction from managers than do negative
signals (why change a winning strategy?). Although an across-the-board
rise in equity and bond values appears to require no managerial changes,
an across-the-board decline might elicit the most intense pressure for
change.
Our illustrative speciﬁcation of the inﬂuence equation (1c) indicates that
past returns may aﬀect managers, but theory provides no indication of the
appropriate lag between signal and action. How long should it take a mar-
ket signal to inﬂuence managers? We wished to let the data describe the
delays associated with market inﬂuence, while preserving a reasonable
number of degrees of freedom for our estimates. Accordingly, we include
three lags of the market signals in our regressions, and three lags of the
exogenous shock variables. We also investigated single-lag models, in
which the explanatory variables were lagged one, two, or three, quarters,
and these produced qualitatively similar results (not reported). The spe-
ciﬁcations we employ permit shareholders and bondholders to have dif-
ferential inﬂuence and for the inﬂuence to diﬀer for between “up” and
“down” return signals.
In our ﬁrst implementation of equation (1c) we classify excess stock and
bond returns as either positive or negative, and interact the resulting four
dummy variables with the absolute value of each security’s return. For
each possible action variables, we estimate:
124 Robert R. Bliss and Mark J. Flannery(3a)
stk
AA I S B I S B




































[( ) ( )
() ( ) ] ||























where Ait is one of the action variables available to BHC i’s managers
during quarter t; k(
 3) is the lag length, in quarters, between market
signal (return) and managerial action; Ii,t(SuBu) is a dummy variable equal
to one for a quarter for which BHC is stock return (S) was up and its bond
return (B) was up, and the variables Ii,t(SmBn)a r ed e ﬁned analogously,
where m, n  u indicates that the security’s value went up, and m, n  d
indicates that the security’s value fell down; |Rstk
i,tk| is the absolute value of
the ith BHC’s stock return over period t  k;| Rbnd
i,tk| is the absolute value
of the ith BHC’s bond return over period t  k; Xt1 i sav e c t o ro fe x o g e -
nous shock variables; and Dt1 is a vector of dummy (control) variables
indicating the years.
The speciﬁcation in equation (3a) captures the interaction of the BHC’s
stock and bond returns, as well as the magnitude of each return. The co-
eﬃcients on lagged values of Ii,t(SdBd)|Rstk
i,tk| (for example) measure the im-
pact of a negative stock return accompanied by a decline in bond value.
(As noted in section 4.4, this combination of stock-bond movements is
consistent with a decrease in the ﬁrm’s asset value.) The coeﬃcients on
Ii,t(SdBd)|Rbnd
i,tk| indicate the eﬀect of a negative bond return under the same
circumstances. Finding that the Rstk-related coeﬃc i e n ti ss i g n i ﬁcant and of
the appropriate sign while the Rbnd-related coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant
would suggest that managers are more responsive to the welfare of share-
holders than to that of bondholders. Of the eight potential combinations
of absolute excess returns with direction of movement indicators, only
some make good economic sense. Suppose the coeﬃcients on Ii,t(SdBd)
|Rbnd
i,tk|a n dIi,t(SdBu)|Rbnd
i,tk| are both signiﬁcant and signed to suggest inﬂu-
ence. This combination of directional dummies suggests that a decrease in
stock price is inﬂuential, regardless of the direction of bond price move-
ment. However, it is diﬃcult to understand why the inﬂuence of a stock
decline should be proportional to the magnitude of the bond excess return!
The speciﬁcation in equation (3a) requires that managerial actions be
proportional to preceding realized returns. However, we noted above that
a security return reﬂects in part the anticipated managerial response, and
this endogeneity may bias the estimated a1 in equation (1c). Moreover, the
absolute returns speciﬁcation in equation (3a) requires that the scale or
probability of managerial action be proportional to the return. To assess
Market Discipline in U.S. Bank Holding Companies 125whether our results depend on this implied restriction, we repeated the
analysis using a three-way classiﬁcation scheme for returns (as shown in
table 4.2, headings A and B).
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where Ait and Xt are deﬁned as in equation (3a) and the dummy variables
Ji,t(SaBb) take the value 1 if the excess stock return (S)i sa and the excess
bond return (B)i sb. The superscripts a and b can take on one of three
values: u  an up return, ranking in the upper third of excess returns on
like securities in the sample; f  a ﬂat return, ranking in the middle third
of excess returns on like securities; and d  a down return, in the lowest
third of excess returns for like securities. The regression in equation (3b)
permits managers to respond to eight types of market signal, correspond-
ing to the outside cells of headings C and D of table 4.2. These measures
of stock and bond returns permit us to incorporate some information
about return magnitudes while minimizing the potential bias caused by
the reﬂection of anticipated managerial actions in Rt1. Note that we retain
a constant term in equation (3b) while omitting the least interesting case
(S fB f) from the speciﬁcation.
The Response Equation
The response equation (2) is estimated separately for stock and bond
excess returns. Instead of a single action surprise driving the excess return,
we now specify that period t security returns depend on a complete set of
n action surprises:
(4a)
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The observed managerial actions (Ai,t) can be combined with the inﬂuence
regression shown in equation (3a) or (3b) to compute the surprise compo-
nent of each action. The sign of bi (b* i ) immediately implies the stockhold-
ers’ (bondholders’) preferred managerial action. We can thus determine
whether, on average over the entire sample, an unexpected dividend cut,
126 Robert R. Bliss and Mark J. Flannery21. One reason why managers cannot perfectly control loan volumes is that many custom-
ers have prenegotiated lines of credit, which can be draw down (or not) without advance
notice.
22. For binary action measures, we estimate equation (3a) or (3b) as a probit and report
the likelihood ratio index (Greene 1993, 651) as a goodness-of-ﬁt statistic.
for example, is viewed as valuable to bondholders. The vector Xt contains
both lagged and contemporaneous (time t) exogenous shock variables.
The Set of Managerial Actions
We have implicitly assumed that managers can eﬀectively control the
actions that investors are trying to aﬀect. Finding measurable variables
with this characteristic presents something of a challenge. Suppose, for
example, that BHC share prices fall in response to large loan losses. The
ﬁrm’s leverage therefore rises, and bondholders would like managers to
reduce leverage back toward its ex ante level. (The shareholders’ prefer-
ence is less clear.) In testing for stockholder and bondholder inﬂuence, one
might be tempted to designate book leverage as a managerial action vari-
able. In the long run, managers can surely reduce book leverage if they
wish. In the short run, however, an eﬀort to lower leverage by tightening
credit standards might be ineﬀective. Because loan demand is not perfectly
controllable or predictable, leverage might still increase in the short run
despite management’s sincere eﬀorts to reduce it.21 Leverage is thus an
ambiguous indicator of managerial action. One response to this situation
is to permit (empirically) managerial changes to occur over several quar-
ters, and we do this. Another response is to deﬁne managerial action more
narrowly, for example, as the sale of new stock or a dividend cut. Managers
unambiguously control dividends and stock issues.
It is diﬃcult to establish that a particular set of action measures is com-
plete or appropriate. Some legitimate action measures may be omitted,
and managers may only imperfectly control some of the included mea-
sures. Our approach is to seek systematic linkages in the data that appear
to be consistent with managers taking responsive actions in the wake of
security losses or gains. By considering a number of regression speciﬁca-
tions and various ways of measuring the key variables, we hope to deter-
mine if the preponderance of the evidence supports the market inﬂuence
hypothesis. Table 4.4 lists our measures of managerial action. We divide
these actions into three subgroups: those aﬀecting leverage, those aﬀecting
asset portfolio risk, and others. For some action variables we include both
a binary classiﬁcation (e.g., dividends up versus not up) and a continuous
measure.22
Exogenous Shock Variables
In a dynamic ﬁrm, managerial action variables may vary through time
for reasons other than the immediate desires of stock or bondholders. In
Market Discipline in U.S. Bank Holding Companies 127order to isolate the eﬀect of past security returns on managerial actions,
therefore, we must control for these exogenous factors. We use an agnostic
statistical approach to absorb predetermined variation in action variables,
regressing changes in each action variable against a large set of control
variables, intended to capture any path dependence in managers’ deci-
sions. Table 4.5 lists the income and balance sheet variables we include to
model predetermined changes in the action variables. Importantly, these
exogenous shock variables do not include past stock and or bond returns.
We also include in the set of exogenous variables
1. year dummy variables, to control for omitted variations in the bank-
ing industry’s condition, ease of access to stock and bond markets, regula-
tory pressures, and so forth;




Factors Aﬀecting BHC Leverage (continuous variables)
CMINCR Increase in value of common stock, as percentage of book value of
equity.
PFINCR Increase in value of preferred stock, as percentage of book value of
equity.
EQINCR Increase in equity, as percentage of book value of equity (sum of
CMINCR and CFINCR).
dSHCRSP Percentage change in number of CRSP common shares outstanding.
dCDIVP Change in common dividend declared as percentage of book value of
equity.
dDIVP Change in common plus preferred dividends declared, as a percentage
of book value of equity.
dQSUBDB Percentage change in sub debt as percentage of quarter-average total
assets.
dBVEQ Change in book value of equity as a percentage of total assets.
TAGROW Quarter to quarter change in total assets divided by beginning of
quarter total assets.
Factors Aﬀecting BHC Leverage (dummy variables)
DCDIVUP 1 if dividend payment (measured in dollars) increased from prior
quarter, 0 otherwise.
DCOMUP 1 if increase in common outstanding, 0 otherwise.
DPFUP 1 if increase in preferred outstanding, 0 otherwise.
DEQUP 1 if increase in either type of equity, 0 otherwise.
DSND 1 if debentures rose in $ value, 0 otherwise.
Factors Aﬀecting Asset Risk
dSECPCT Change in securities portfolio as a proportion of total assets.
Other Measures of Managerial Action
dFTEMP Percentage change in number of full-time equivalent employees.
dUINSINS Change in uninsured liabilities as a percentage of insured liabilities.
dUNINTA Change in uninsured liabilities as a proportion of total assets.
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Variable
Name Variable Description
CASHTA BHC’s cash, divided by total assets
CILNTA BHC’s commercial and industrial loans, divided by total assets.
CPTA BHC’s commercial paper outstanding, divided by total assets.
GLOANSTA BHC’s gross loans, divided by total assets.
TRADETA BHC’s assets held in trading portfolio, divided by total assets.
NINCTA BHC’s net income, divided by total assets.
TOTLIATA BHC’s total liabilities, divided by total assets.
LNPDTA BHC’s loans past due 90 days or more, divided by total assets.
LNSNATA BHC’s loans on non-accrual status, divided by total assets.
CHRGOTA BHC’s loan chargeoﬀs, divided by total assets.
RECVRTA BHC’s recoveries on loans previously charged oﬀ, divided by total
assets.
LNTA BHC’s natural log of total assets.
Notes: All BHC ratios are measured as changes, from one end-of-quarter to the next. The
total assets divisor is the quarterly average of total assets, not the quarter-end value. Except
three quarterly lags (t  1, t  2, t  3) of all control variables are included in inﬂuence
equations (3). Contemporaneous and three quarterly lags (t, t  1, t  2, t  3) of all control
variables are included in response equations (4).
2. recent quarterly changes in the (dependent) decision variable in the
inﬂuence equation (1); and
3. one quarterly lag of the dependent variable (a stock or bond return)
in the response equation (2).
Note that the lagged BHC ratios in equation (3a) or (3b) may be corre-
lated with the lagged security returns. We include both sets of explanatory
variables in the regression, thereby permitting the data to apportion ex-
planatory power between the lagged returns and lagged control variables.
As one indicator of the importance of market inﬂuence, we will report the
marginal contribution to R2 for the accounting and security return vari-
ables.
4.6 Empirical Results
We now present and interpret estimation results for the inﬂuence (equa-
tions [3a] and [3b]) and response (equations [4a] and [4b]) regressions. We
ﬁrst consider the estimated coeﬃcients’ parametric statistical signiﬁcance,
in the context of table 4.3 and the discussion in section 4.5.2. This ap-
proach yields little evidence of beneﬁcial investor inﬂuence. We then apply
a sign-based analysis that ignores parametric statistical signiﬁcance and
looks for patterns consistent with the beneﬁcial and perverse inﬂuence
hypotheses. We ﬁnd some extreme cases, where the signs of all coeﬃcients
are consistent with one hypothesis or the other, for which we can reject the
null hypothesis of no inﬂuence. However, in most cases the signs are not
Market Discipline in U.S. Bank Holding Companies 129all consistent, and we can only note the tendency one way or the other in
the data.
4.6.1 Analysis of Inﬂuence Regressions
We identify signiﬁcant inﬂuence coeﬃcients (the analogs of a1 in equa-
tion [1]) on the basis of the sum of the three lagged coeﬃcients for each
action variable. Table 4.6 presents these sums and their corresponding sta-
tistical signiﬁcancefortheinﬂuencespeciﬁcationinequation(3a),andtable
4.7 presents the results for the speciﬁcation in equation (3b). The “HO: All
returncoeﬃcients0”rowsprovidetheformaltestoftheno-inﬂuencenull
hypothesis.In both speciﬁcations the null is rejected for twelve of eighteen
a c t i o nv a r i a b l e sa tt h e1 0p e r c e n tl e v e l .A p p l y i n ga5p e r c e n tc o n ﬁdence
level, we reject the null for eleven action variables in table 4.6 and nine
action variables using the alternative speciﬁcation of table 4.7.
The two inﬂuence speciﬁcations in equations (3a) and (3b) exhibit a
good deal of similarity in the actions they identify as responding to lagged
returns. Both speciﬁcations reject the no-inﬂuence hypothesis (10 percent
level) for nearly half of our continuous action variables (CMINCR,
EQINCR, dCDIVP, TAGROW, and dUININS) and four of the ﬁve binary
action variables (DCOMUP, DPFUP, DEQUP, DSND). Several variables
(dSHCRSP, dQSUBDB, dSECPCT) carry jointly insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient
sums (10 percent level) in both tables. Overall, the frequencies with which
we reject the no-inﬂuence null hypothesis in tables 4.6 and 4.7 strongly
suggest more than simple sampling variation. These results are consistent
with investors exerting some inﬂuence over BHC managers.
Moreover, many of the individually signiﬁcant summed return coeﬃ-
cient combinations are economically sensible. We expect inﬂuence to be
weakest for SuBu combinations and strongest for SdBd combinations. The
coeﬃcient estimates reﬂect this general pattern, though not overwhelm-
ingly: Table 4.6 exhibits nine signiﬁcant coeﬃcients (10 percent level) for
the SdBd combinations, against ﬁve for SuBu. Table 4.7 exhibits eight sig-
niﬁcant SdBd coeﬃcients against ﬁve for SuBu.
We illustrate the degree to which past security returns contribute to sub-
sequent actions by comparing the full inﬂuence model’s R2 statistic against
the R2 value when subsets of explanatory variables have been omitted. R2
statistics indicate that the full model explains a large fraction of the ob-
served variation in most of the action variables. Dropping the lagged re-
turn variables from the right-hand side reduces the explanatory power of
the model only marginally, and so does dropping the exogenous shocks. A
signiﬁcant fraction of the explanatory power of these regressions comes
from the lagged dependent variables. Thus, although the coeﬃcients on
the returns in the inﬂuence equation are sometimes statistically signiﬁcant,
the lagged returns do not provide a great deal of additional information.
Finding that managerial actions follow past return patterns is consistent























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)with inﬂuence, but we must look at the response equations to determine if
this apparent inﬂuence is associated with actions that actually enhance
security values.
4.6.2 Parametric Evidence about Inﬂuence
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 combine new information about estimated response
equations (4a) and (4b) with the inﬂuence equation coeﬃcient estimates
already presented in tables 4.6 and 4.7. The inﬂuence hypothesis is not
strongly supported by the response regression coeﬃcients. Stock excess
returns respond signiﬁcantly to only three and four action variable sur-
prises in tables 4.8 and 4.9, respectively, but the only signiﬁcantly valuable
actions that appear in both speciﬁcations are dUNINTA and DCDIVUP.
(Even then, the signiﬁcant, opposite signs on the similar variables
dUININS and dUNINTA in table 4.9 seem puzzling.) One of the three
signiﬁcant response variables in table 4.8 (dSECPCT) is not associated
with signiﬁcant inﬂuence. Table 4.9 provides only two additional actions
(dCDIVP and dUININS) that are aﬀected by past returns and that, in
turn, signiﬁcantly aﬀect excess stock returns when action is taken.
The bonds’ response regressions exhibit even fewer signiﬁcant eﬀects.
The only action surprises with signiﬁcant return response coeﬃcients are
dSECPCT in table 4.8, and dFTEMP in table 4.9; both are signiﬁcant only
at the 10 percent level.
Investor inﬂuence requires a1  0a n db1  0. The dearth of signiﬁcant
return responses (b1) therefore provides scant evidence of investor inﬂu-
ence. In table 4.8 the signiﬁcant stock and bond response coeﬃcients for
dSECPCT are not associated with any signiﬁcant inﬂuence coeﬃcients.
The signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on stock response to dUNINTA is associated
with a signiﬁcant inﬂuence variable (on SdBd), and the signs are consistent
with beneﬁcial inﬂuence. Unhappily, this picture is spoiled by the fact that
the signiﬁcant stock response is associated with a signiﬁcant bond inﬂu-
ence. Table 4.9 is not much more encouraging. The signiﬁcant stock re-
sponse coeﬃcient for dCDIVP is associated with two weak inﬂuences in
turn associated with stock-down states, consistent with inﬂuence. How-
ever, the coeﬃcient signs imply perverse, rather than beneﬁcial, inﬂuence.
The weakly signiﬁcant bond response coeﬃcient on dFTEMP is associ-
ated with a weakly signiﬁcant inﬂuence coeﬃcient on the action for SuBd,
consistent with inﬂuence, although again perverse rather than beneﬁcial.
The signiﬁcant dUININS stock response coeﬃcient is associated with
three signiﬁcant inﬂuence variables. In this case the signs are consistent
with beneﬁcial inﬂuence, but the three return states that appear to be in-
ﬂuencing the dUININS action variable are all bond-down states. This
seems inconsistent with stocks’ inﬂuencing actions. The signiﬁcant
dUNINTA stock response is associated with bond-down-related inﬂuence
coeﬃcients, and the signs are consistent with perverse inﬂuence. Finally,


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.in both tables 4.6 and 4.7 the signiﬁcant stock response on the DCDIVUP
action variable is associated with several inﬂuences; again predominantly
of bond-down states and of signs consistent with perverse inﬂuence.
In summary, although there appears to be signiﬁcant association be-
tween return variables and subsequent managerial actions, the evidence
from combining the inﬂuence and response regression results is very weak,
and in no case is there clear evidence of beneﬁcial inﬂuence. Obviously,
failure to reject a null hypothesis of no inﬂuence is not conclusive evidence
against stock and bondholder inﬂuence, but neither is it evidence for in-
ﬂuence. The few instances of inﬂuence that we can detect parametrically
are consistent with perverse, rather than beneﬁcial, inﬂuence.
4.6.3 Nonparametric Evidence about Inﬂuence
The broadly insigniﬁcant results for the response regressions might re-
ﬂect a general power failure for the parametric tests applied in the usual
sort of regression analysis. We therefore evaluate whether a simple, non-
parametric signs test can provide consistent interpretations of the results
in tables 4.6 and 4.7. To conserve space we discuss only the tertiary speci-
ﬁcation results in table 4.9. The results in table 4.8 are similar.
The inﬂuence equation speciﬁcation in table 4.9 includes six explanatory
variables that can reasonably be associated with stock return inﬂuence
on managerial actions: SuBu, SuB f, SuBd, SdBu, SdB f,a n dSdBd (stock ﬂat
combinations are unlikely to be associated with stock inﬂuence). The anal-
ogous variables are consistent with bond return inﬂuence: SuBu, S fBu,
SdBu, SuBd, S fBd,a n dSdBd. The probability that six coeﬃcients will carry
the same sign by chance alone is approximately 1.6 percent. Five out of
six coeﬃcients bearing the same sign would appear by chance 18.8 percent
of the time. A nonparametric sign test of beneﬁcial or perverse inﬂuence
would reject the no-inﬂuence null at the 5 percent level if all six stock
inﬂuence coeﬃcients are the same sign as the stock response coeﬃcient
(beneﬁcial) or the opposite sign (perverse). Where fewer than six relevant
inﬂuence coeﬃcients have the same sign, the inﬂuence coeﬃcient signs
may suggest a relation one way or the other (if not half-positive and half-
negative), but these results are statistically inconclusive. Taking the top
row of table 4.9 (for the managerial action CMINCR) as an example, the
stock response coeﬃcient (5.642) is positive, so beneﬁcial inﬂuence re-
quires positive coeﬃcients on the three stock-up and three stock-down
inﬂuence coeﬃcients. Four of the relevant inﬂuence coeﬃcients are posi-
tive (SuBu, SuBd, SdB f, SdBd), and two are negative (SuB f, SdBu). This is
suggestive of beneﬁcial inﬂuence, but not signiﬁcant. A single “B” in the
stock column of the “Beneﬁcial/Perverse Inﬂuence” results column de-
notes this. The dUNINTA results provide clear, signiﬁcant evidence of
beneﬁcial stock inﬂuence—denoted “BB” in the stock “Beneﬁcial/Per-
verse Inﬂuence” results column—as well as signiﬁcant perverse bond in-
Market Discipline in U.S. Bank Holding Companies 139ﬂuence, denoted “PP” in the bond column. Table 4.8 can only provide
weak evidence of inﬂuence. For stocks there are only four relevant inﬂu-
ence coeﬃcients: those associated with the absolute value of the stock re-
turn. The chance of all four coeﬃcients having the same sign is 6.3 percent.
Even though this is signiﬁcant at only the 10% level, we also denote this
outcome with “BB” or “PP,” if appropriate.
These nonparametric sign tests of beneﬁcial and perverse inﬂuence pro-
duce mixed results. Over both speciﬁcations we ﬁnd eight (of 36) signiﬁ-
cant cases of beneﬁcial stock inﬂuence, and four signiﬁcant cases of per-
verse stock inﬂuence. The “suggestive” stock results break down seven
beneﬁcial to ten perverse. Less rigorously, some indication (signiﬁcant or
otherwise) of beneﬁcial stock inﬂuence obtains in ﬁfteen versus fourteen
cases for perverse inﬂuence, with seven cases being completely neutral.
The corresponding bond results are eight cases of signiﬁcant beneﬁcial
bond inﬂuence, seven cases of signiﬁcant perverse bond inﬂuence, ﬁfteen
cases at least suggestive of beneﬁcial bond inﬂuence, sixteen cases at least
suggestive of perverse inﬂuence, and ﬁve cases completely neutral. Once
again, the only strong conclusion we can draw from these results is that the
data are not uniformly consistent with the presence of beneﬁcial investor
discipline for sample banking ﬁrms.
4.7 Summary and Conclusions
The concept of market discipline has attained great popularity in discus-
sions of regulatory reform, both in the United States and abroad. Market
discipline implies two quite distinct notions, which we have tried to sepa-
rate: private investors’ ability to understand (monitor) a ﬁnancial ﬁrm’s
true condition, and their ability to inﬂuence managerial actions in appro-
priate ways. A large body of evidence suggests that markets monitor ﬁnan-
cial ﬁrms eﬀectively and promptly, but speciﬁc tests of investor inﬂuence
have been much more limited. Previous research provides some infor-
mation about shareholders’ ability to inﬂuence ﬁrm managers, particularly
in extreme situations; but empirical evidence about bondholders’ ability
to inﬂuence ﬁrm behavior has been lacking.
We assembled information about large U.S. BHCs’ stock and bond re-
turns for the period 1986–97. One view of corporate capital structure em-
phasizes the potential conﬂicts between shareholders and debtholders in a
levered ﬁrm. In examining quarterly excess returns for our sample, we ﬁnd
that stock and bond prices move in the same direction more than half the
time. Despite the potential importance of stockholder-bondholder con-
ﬂicts, the two groups frequently share common interests with respect to
ﬁrm performance.
To assess whether bondholders can eﬀectively inﬂuence banking ﬁrms,
we explicitly modeled the interaction between investors and managers and
140 Robert R. Bliss and Mark J. Flanneryshowed how beneﬁcial inﬂuence should be manifested in the data. Al-
though the methodology is not perfect, we had hoped it would identify
appropriate managerial responses to observable, exogenous events that
aﬀect BHC value. Some types of beneﬁcial inﬂuence will be undetectable:
for example, if managers refrain from taking actions that they know would
elicit investor chagrin, or if managers always respond appropriately to ex-
ogenous shocks. Accordingly, we note that our methodology probably
identiﬁes a lower bound on the extent of beneﬁcial investor inﬂuence.
The empirical results fall into two categories. First, the standard para-
metric tests provided very little evidence for investor inﬂuence. Despite
many statistically signiﬁcant associations between returns and subsequent
managerial actions, we could not interpret the overall coeﬃcient estimates
as supporting beneﬁcial inﬂuence. The weakness in the parametric tests
derives from the paucity of meaningful return responses to our managerial
action variables. The parametric evidence is not inconsistent with inﬂu-
ence. It is simply inconclusive.
A less rigorous, nonparametric interpretation of the regression results
identiﬁes evidence consistent with both beneﬁcial and perverse inﬂuence.
For bondholders, the instances of beneﬁcial and perverse inﬂuence are
equal in number. Stockholders appear to exert signiﬁcant beneﬁcial inﬂu-
ence about twice as often as they exert perverse inﬂuence, consistent with
the fact that equity has much more extensive control rights in normal cir-
cumstances. However one chooses to interpret these nonparametric re-
sults, the evidence cannot be said to unambiguously support the presence
of beneﬁcial investor inﬂuence on BHC ﬁrms over the sample period.
If these conclusions withstand further analysis, the implications for reg-
ulatory reliance on market forces are important, but simple. Other research
indicates that private investors monitor ﬁnancial ﬁrms and may even antic-
ipate changes in their ﬁnancial condition. Our results do not address this
question and so carry no implication for proposals to more formally incor-
porated market signals into the government supervisory process. However,
in the absence of speciﬁc evidence that BHC stock- and bondholders can
eﬀectively inﬂuence managerial actions under normal operating condi-
tions, supervisors would be unwise to rely on investors—including subor-
dinated debenture holders—to constrain BHC risk taking. At least under
current institutional arrangements, supervisors must retain the responsi-
bility for inﬂuencing managerial actions.
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Comment Raghuram G. Rajan
This paper examines whether bank actions are, in fact, disciplined by mar-
kets. It starts by arguing that market discipline has two components. The
ﬁrst is monitoring, which implies the market’s ability to reﬂect what is
happening inside the ﬁrm and, sometimes, to predict what will happen to
it. The second is inﬂuence, which refers to the eﬀe c to fm a r k e tm o v e m e n t s
on managerial actions. The authors argue that both components are neces-
sary for market discipline to work. The paper is very timely in that regula-
tory authorities are increasingly despairing of supervising the complicated
processes that go on inside a modern ﬁnancial institution and would like
to rely on the market to take over some of their tasks. Taken at face value,
the results of the paper suggest that it may be premature to delegate super-
visory functions to the market because although the market seems to rec-
ognize when something is going on, managerial actions do not seem to be
inﬂuenced by market movements.
Market Discipline in U.S. Bank Holding Companies 143The task the authors undertake is to be commended. There are, however,
diﬃculties in the methodology. They must be able both to interpret what
the market reaction suggests is wrong and to specify precisely what actions
will be taken to remedy it. This is diﬃcult at the level of a case study, let
alone in large samples. But there is a more fundamental concern. If, in
fact, market discipline works well, then managers should anticipate the
reactions of the market and not mess up. The market should react only to
factors beyond managers’ control. In this case, however, we should indeed
see no eﬀect of the market on managerial actions. So does one conclude
from the results that market discipline does not work or that it works too
well?
Most of us start with the preconception that managers are not angels,
so let us assume, as the authors do, that managers do not do everything
perfectly. The problem is that the methodology is even now biased against
ﬁnding that markets exert inﬂuence. As the authors recognize, positive
market reactions are unlikely to change managerial actions—if it ain’t
broke, why ﬁx it? But what does a negative market reaction indicate? The
authors’ preferred interpretation is that the market may be uncertain about
whether managers will be shamed into ﬁxing the problem, and hence it
reacts adversely to signs of the problem. The most negative reaction, how-
ever, will be when the market is convinced that managers will not ﬁx the
problem or that they cannot ﬁx it. In other words, the most adverse reac-
tions will be met by no action, whereas moderate reactions will be met by
substantial action. These nonlinear possibilities cloud interpretation of the
results. The authors do recognize that the magnitude of the market reac-
tion may not be representative, and also present regressions with dummy
variables. I would focus on these.
The last diﬃculty the authors have is in correlating market reaction to
speciﬁc operational responses. The problem is that a market reaction
could come for any reason. Because the authors do not know why the
market has reacted, they can only rely on some very coarse reasoning (I
do not use this term pejoratively) about what the appropriate managerial
action should be.
In short, even modulo all the caveats, predicting operational reactions
is hard. In fact, would a regulator be happy if she saw a bank changing its
operations with every blip in market prices? Clintonian management may
be appropriate in politics, but what would one conclude about a bank
manager who let the market determine his every decision?
This suggests that if one were to look for more comfort about the eﬀects
of markets, one may have to rely on coarser but more signiﬁcant responses.
For example, as in Steve Kaplan’s studies of German and Japanese ﬁrms,
does a fall in stock (or subordinate bond) price presage more managerial
turnover than the average?
144 Robert R. Bliss and Mark J. FlanneryThe bottom line is that this paper is interesting in large part because the
authors ask very good questions about how one could test for the existence
of market inﬂuence. I also like the model they present, which highlights the
precise assumptions they need to ﬁnd any evidence of market discipline.
Whether the reader leans to their view that the tests have some power, or
to the skeptical view that they do not, the paper gives the reader a good
way of thinking about the issue. Nevertheless, because the questions they
raise are only partially answered, the conclusions must be viewed as ten-
tative.
Discussion Summary
Mark Carey began the discussion by suggesting that the authors augment
their work by focusing on events. Robert Eisenbeis wondered what the au-
thors were trying to capture. He noted that often ﬁr m sa w a yf r o mt h e
eﬃcient frontier move back to the frontier using diﬀerent combinations of
actions. He suggested that this might be a good framework.
Charles Calomiris had a somewhat diﬀerent take on the paper’s results
for policy. He noted that before the implementation of deposit insurance
in the United States markets disciplined banks through depositer exit. He
observed that as equity fell, banks had to respond or lose deposits. He
noted that bond market discipline might be less organized because cove-
nants are hard to enforce and bondholders are unable to run. He observed
that this problem is even more diﬃcult with insured deposits; as bondhold-
ers exit banks shift from bond funding to insured deposits. Empirical evi-
dence, he further observed, suggests that bank bond debt shrinks as banks
get into trouble.
Doug Diamond began by asking what we should see and do. He noted
that from a ﬁnancial perspective, managers maximize the value of the ﬁrm
across all claimants. Absent regulation, we should not expect to see actions
favoring one claimant over another. He pointed out that at banks there are
three claimants—debt, equity and regulators—and that this third claim-
ant will have more clout. This, he observed, leads to the question of
whether regulatory interventions cause changes. He concluded that if regu-
latory actions lead to market response, then we might not expect to see a
further response.
Alan Berger noted a key link that has not been investigated—an identi-
ﬁcation problem. He noted that some apparent actions might in fact be
the outcome of previous actions. He suggested that the authors look at
nonperforming loans; these may not be actions of the bank but may have
been previously identiﬁed as bad loans by bondholders. Finally, he noted
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ise: After supervisors identify problems, they then show up as nonper-
forming loans, making it hard to identify the action and the reaction.
Following up on Berger’s argument, Frederic Mishkin wondered whether
we can identify actions and reactions given that bonds are forward looking.
He observed that we might never be able to infer causality: With forward-
looking variables it is even harder to get a controlled experiment.
Mark Flannery began the response by noting that these issues are linked.
He suggested that the focus on the three claimants may be key. In terms
of predicting versus inﬂuencing, he noted that the authors do regress resid-
uals on market returns in order to address these concerns partially. He
agreed that they should think about Modigliani and Miller and stay away
from stockholders.
In response to Eisenbeis, Robert Bliss noted that movement back to the
frontier might be a third step. He agreed with Calomiris that the current
regulatory environment will undermine discipline and could continue un-
der a subordinated debt proposal. To Berger he responded that if there
is inﬂuence, then it is hard to ﬁnd evidence. This ﬁnding suggests that
monitoring-based subordinated debt proposals should be evaluated more
closely.
Michael Dooley reopened the discussion by asking what the objective of
the third claimant (the regulator) is. He noted that if the insurance fund
h a sad i ﬀerent objective function, then this should be explicit. Berger noted
that research (by Flannery and others) suggests that bondholders and su-
pervisors seem to have the same objectives and reactions.
James Wilcox suggested looking at the response to merger announce-
ments—if the acquiring banks stock value falls on the announcement,
then why aren’t mergers called oﬀ? Flannery noted that this related to
discussant Raghuram Rajan’s ﬁrst point. He observed that managers who
expect a big fall in stock value might not bring mergers to market. He ar-
gued thatin thiscase we maynot seeevidence of disciplineeven though itis
in fact strong.
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